These generals had a broader scope, but were a minority, and did not determine the course of the Great War. From the future perspective, the generals looked out towards multiple battles in several theaters, reducing the value of one single battle to virtually zero unless it supported the goals in a specific theatre. The historical perspective showed generals, who believed that a successful battle was the culmination of all the work and the key to strategic success, and consequently these generals interfered in almost everything, even in the smallest detail. During the Great War, the generals were looking in the same way as Janus, the two-headed God, to the past and the future. The level itself was already there although the military leaders were not aware of it and did not create such a level with all its consequences. This article deals with the Great War during which the term ‘operational level’ did not exist. Members of the Korps Hofmann in Galicia: during the Great War, German military leaders sought to strengthen failing Austria-Hungarian divisions by coming up with tactical solutions. Photo National Library of Austria The commander and his headquarters at operational level translate the political guidance and directions into feasible military plans and orders. Today the operational level is considered as a very important link between the strategic and tactical level. And during the 1970s the Americans, after the war in Vietnam, reintroduced the name operational level and from that moment on many NATO countries also adopted the term. In the Interbellum Russian military thinker Alexandr Svechin labeled it as the operational level. Although the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905) demonstrated a first glimpse of this operational level, whereby the American and Russian military leaders commanded huge masses of forces, the operational level developed gradually over time. It also pays attention to how military commanders acted at the operational level by taking a closer look at their roles and responsibilities. This article focuses on the connection between strategy and tactics: the operational level. Contemporary strategic leadership faces almost the same challenges as leaders faced during the Great War. A study of the Great War 1914-1918 offers the officer of today a unique opportunity to learn about strategic leadership in relation to innovation, alignment of the end-ways-means-risks, a dynamic and complex environment, and the lack of an operational level. By studying military exploits of the past they learn from the mistakes of others. Officers learn by studying, and during exercises and operations they learn by doing, meanwhile gaining experience.
Allenby’s approach was a precursor of a campaign plan, while a German operational level never even came into being. There, based upon his experiences at the Western Front, general Edmund Allenby understood that the strategic leader could not attain complete knowledge of the many facts influencing the theatre, including the battlefield.
British military leadership in the Middle East showed another picture. Generals like Falkenhayn, Haig, and Ludendorff were convinced that a tactical success might initiate a strategic triumph. During the Great War of 1914-1918 the operational level was virtually non-existent, meaning that there was officially no linking pin between strategy and the tactical battles, and consequently, the end-ways-means-risks were not aligned.
0 kommentar(er)
